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When developing a safety-critical system it is essential to obtain an assessment of different design
alternatives. In particular, an early safety assessment of the architectural design of a system is desir-
able. In spite of the plethora of available formal quantitative analysis methods it is still difficult for
software and system architects to integrate these techniques into their every day work. This is mainly
due to the lack of methods that can be directly applied to architecture level models, for instance given
as UML diagrams. Also, it is necessary that the description methods used do not require a profound
knowledge of formal methods. Our approach bridges this gap and improves the integration of quan-
titative safety analysis methods into the development process. All inputs of the analysis are specified
at the level of a UML model. This model is then automatically translated into the analysis model,
and the results of the analysis are consequently represented on the level of the UML model. Thus
the analysis model and the formal methods used during the analysis are hidden from the user. We
illustrate the usefulness of our approach using an industrial strength case study.
1 Introduction
In a recent joint work with our industrial partner TRW Automotive GmbH we have proven the applica-
bility of probabilistic verification techniques to safety analysis in an industrial setting [4]. The analysis
approach that we used was that of probabilistic Failure Modes Effect Analysis (pFMEA) [12].
The most notable shortcoming of the approach that we observed lies in the missing connection of
our analysis to existing high-level architecture models and the modeling languages that they are typically
written in. TRW Automotive GmbH, like many other software development enterprises in the embedded
systems domain, mostly uses the Unified Modeling Language (UML) [27] for system modeling. During
the pFMEA we however had to use the language provided by the analysis tool that we used, in this case
the input language of the stochastic model checker PRISM [14]. This required a manual translation from
the design language UML to the formal modeling language PRISM. This manual translation has the
following shortcomings: (1) It is a time-consuming and hence expensive process. (2) It is error-prone,
since behaviors may be introduced that are not present in the original model. (3) The results of the formal
analysis may not be easily transferable to the level of the high-level design language. To avoid problems
that may result from (2) and (3), additional checks for plausibility have to be made, which again consume
time. Some introduced errors may even remain unnoticed.
The objective of this paper is to bridge the gap between architectural design and formal stochastic
modeling languages so as to remedy the negative implications of this gap listed above. This allows
for a more seamless integration of formal dependability and reliability analysis into the design process.
We propose an extension of the UML to capture probabilistic and error behavior information that are
relevant for a formal stochastic analysis, such as when performing, for instance, pFMEA. All inputs of
the analysis can be specified at the level of the UML model. In order to achieve this goal, we present
an extension of the UML that allows for the annotation of UML models with quantitative information,
such as for instance failure rates. Additionally, a translation process from UML models to the PRISM
language is defined.
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Structure of the paper. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we present
our QuantUM approach, in Section 3 we discuss the automatic construction of CSL formulas. The map-
ping of probabilistic counterexamples onto UML sequence diagrams is described in Section 4. Section
5 is devoted to the case study of an airbag system. Followed by a discussion of related work in Section
6. We conclude in Section 8.
2 The QuantUM Approach
In our approach all inputs of the analysis are specified at the level of a UML model. To facilitate the
specification, we propose a quantitative extension of the UML. This extension is defined in terms of an
UML Profile and takes advantage of the UML concept of a stereotype. Due to space restrictions, we can
not elaborate all details of the proposed profile here, we will only present two central concepts, namely
the QUMComponent stereotype and how the operational profile is captured with UML state machine
diagrams. A comprehensive description of the profile can be found in [21].
The stereotype QUMComponent can be assigned to all UML elements that represent building blocks
of the real system, which include classes, components and interfaces. Each element with the stereotype
QUMComponent comprises up to one (hierarchical) state machine representing the normal behavior and
between one and finitely many (hierarchical) state machines representing possible failure patterns. These
state machines can be either state machines that are especially constructed for this QUMComponent,
or they can be taken from a repository of state machines describing standard failure behaviors. The
repository provides state machines for all standard components (e.g., switches) and the reuse of these
state machines saves modeling effort and avoids redundant descriptions. In some cases, the normal
behavior of a QUMComponent is not of interest for the analysis, for instance when describing failures of
external components. In those cases the specification of the failure pattern state machines is sufficient.
In addition, each QUMComponent comprises a list called Rates that contains rates together with names
identifying them.
In order to capture the operational profile and particularly to allow the specification of quantitative
information, such as failure rates, we extend the Transition element used in UML state machines with
the stereotypes QUMAbstractStochasticTransition and QUMStochasticTransition. These stereotypes al-
low the user to specify transition rates as well as a name for the transition. The specified rates are used
as transition rates for the continuous-time Markov chains that are generated for the purpose of stochas-
tic analysis. Transitions with the stereotype QUMAbstractStochasticTransition are transitions that do not
have a default rate. If a state machine is connected to a QUMComponent element, there has to be a rate in
the Rates list of the QUMComponent that has the same name as the QUMAbstractStochasticTransition.
This rate is then considered for the QUMAbstractStochasticTransition. The QUMAbstractStochastic-
Transition allows to define general state machines in a repository where the rates can be set individually
for each component. The stereotypes QUMAbstractFailureTransition, QUMAbstractRepairTransition,
QUMFailureTransition and QUMRepairTransition are specializations of QUMAbstractStochasticTran-
sition and QUMStochasticTransition, respectively.
The normal behavior state machine and all failure pattern state machines of a QUMComponent are
implicitly combined in one hierarchical state machine, cf. Figure 1. The combined state machine is au-
tomatically generated by the analysis tool and is not visible to the user. Its semantics can be described as
follows: initially, the component executes the normal behavior state machine. If a QUMAbstractFailure-
Transition is enabled, the component will enter the state machine describing the corresponding failure
pattern with the specified rate. The decision, which of the n FailurePatterns is selected, is made by a
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stochastic ”race” between the transitions.
Figure 1: Combination of normal behavior and failure pattern state machines.
We define the semantics of QuantUM by defining a set of translation rules which map the UML
artifacts that we defined to the input language of the model checker PRISM [14], which is considered
to possess a formal semantics. This corresponds to the commonly held idea that the semantics of a
UML model is largely defined by the underlying code generator. These translation rules enable a fully
automated translation of the UML model into the PRISM language. We base our semantic transformation
on the operational UML semantics defined in [20]. The counterexamples generated by our PRISM
extension DiPro [5] are subsequently mapped onto fault trees and UML sequence diagrams, which makes
them interpretable at the level of the UML model. Due to the fully automated nature of our approach the
analysis model and the formal methods used during the analysis are completely hidden from the user.
Our approach depicted in Fig. 2 can be summarized by identifying the following steps:
Figure 2: Overview of the QuantUM Approach.
• Our UML extension is used to annotate the UML model with all information that is needed to
perform a dependability analysis.
• The annotated UML model is then exported in the XML Metadata Interchange (XMI) format [23]
which is the standard format for exchanging UML models.
• Subsequently, our QuantUM Tool parses the generated XMI file and generates the analysis model
in the input language of the probabilistic model checker PRISM as well the properties to be veri-
fied.
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• For the analysis we use the probabilistic model checker PRISM together with DiPro in order to
compute probabilistic counterexamples representing paths leading to a hazard state.
• The resulting counterexamples can then be transformed into a fault tree that can be interpreted at
the level of the UML model. Alternatively, they can be mapped onto a UML sequence diagram
which can be displayed in the UML modeling tool containing the original UML model.
In order to achieve the full automation that we argued for above it is important that a) the properties
to be verified are automatically generated, and b) the counterexamples can be interpreted at the level of
the UML model. We next discuss these two issues in more detail.
3 Automatic Generation of CSL Formulas
The properties to be analyzed are important inputs to the analysis of the QuantUM extended UML model.
In stochastic model checking using PRISM, the property that is to be verified needs to be specified using
a variant of temporal logic called Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) [1, 7]. We offer two possibilities
for property specification: first we automatically generate a set of CSL properties out of the UML model,
and second we allow the user to manually specify CSL properties.
We only give a brief introduction into CSL, for a more comprehensive description we refer to [7].
CSL is a stochastic variant of the Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [10] with state and path formulas
based on [6]. The state formulas are interpreted over states of a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC)
[17], whereas the path formulas are interpreted over paths in a CTMC. CSL extends CTL with two
probabilistic operators that refer to the steady state and transient behavior of the model. The steady-state
operator refers to the probability of residing in a particular set of states, specified by a state formula, in
the long run. The transient operator allows us to refer to the probability of the occurrence of particular
paths in the CTMC. In order to express the time span of a certain path, the path operators until (U) and
next (X) are extended with a parameter that specifies a time interval.
The automatic generation of CSL formulas out of the UML model requires the definition of a UML
extension that allows us to refer to states of the UML model in the generated formulas. We introduce
the stereotype QUMStateConfiguration (cf. Fig. 3) as part of our UML Profile described in [21]. This
stereotype can be used to assign names to state configurations. In order to do so, the stereotype is
assigned to states in the state machines of the UML model. All QUMStateConfiguration stereotypes
with the same name are treated as one state configuration. This is reminiscent of labels in the PRISM
language. A state configuration can also be seen as a boolean formula, each state can either be true
when the system is in this state or false, when the system is not in this state. The operator variable
indicates whether the boolean variables representing the states are connected by an and-operator (AND)
or an or-operator (OR). The name of the state configuration is used during model to refer to these state
configurations in the UML model.
We now discuss how the states of the UML model are translated into the PRISM model. For each
QUMComponent, its states are encoded as integer values. States representing the normal behavior are
always assigned a value between 0 and the total number of states representing normal behavior (#norm-
state). All failure states are identified by a number that is greater than #normstate. The placeholders
%#normstate% and %#failstates% represent the number of states in the normal behavior state machine
and failure pattern state machines respectively. The variable %module id% state is then used, in the
PRISM model, to represent the states of the UML state machines, according to the state encoding ex-
plained above. Note that %module id% will be replaced by an identifier which refers to the respective
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Figure 3: Definition of the QUMStateConfiguration stereotype.
QUMComponent. The translation of the model to PRISM is done in linear time, by iterating over the
QUMComponents.
In the following we describe how state formulas can automatically be generated by the QuantUM
tool. The properties that we wish to generate fall into three categories:
• First we generate a property that can be used to compute the probability of a component to be in the
failed state. This formula is generated for each component with the stereotype QUMComponent.
• Second, we generate a formula which computes the probability of the failure of any component,
which means that at least one of the components with the stereotype QUMComponent is in a failure
state.
• Third, we compute one formula for each QUMStateConfiguration that can be used to compute the
probability of reaching this state configuration.
In the following we describe how formulas falling into these categories can be automatically generated.
Probability of the failure of a specified QUMComponent. A QUMComponent is failed whenever it
has entered a failure pattern state machine. Hence, whenever the value of the variable %module id% state
is greater than %#normstate%, the component is failed. The resulting state formula representing the fail-
ure of a component is:
(%module id% state > %#normstate%)
Thus, the CSL formula
P=?[(true)U<=T (%module id% state > %#normstate%)]
can be used to determine the probability of a failure of the QUMComponent with the specified module
id within mission time T.
Probability of the failure of any QUMComponent. The state formula
(%module id1% state > %#normstate%) |
(%module id2% state > %#normstate%) |...|
(%module idn% state > %#normstate%)
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represents the failure of any of the components with module ids %module id1%...%module idn%. Sim-
ilarly to the above, the CSL formula
P=?[(true)U<=T ((%module id1% state > %#normstate%) |
(%module id2% state > %#normstate%) |...|
(%module idn% state > %#normstate%))]
can be used to determine the probability of a failure of any of the QUMComponents within mission time
T.
Probability of a QUMStateConfiguration. As already explained, each QUMStateConfiguration can
also be interpreted as a boolean formula. A state can then either be true, when the module is in this state
or in one of its sub-states, or false, when the module is not in this state. The operator variable indicates
whether the boolean variables representing the states are connected by a boolean and-operator (AND) or
a boolean or-operator (OR). The states are identified by the state encoding explained above, hence the
boolean expressions
in state id = (state id≤%module id% state≤ state id substaten)
can be used to determine whether a QUMComponent is in a state with the state id in %state id%, or in
one of its sub-states. If the state with %state id% does not have sub-states, the expression
in state id = (%module id% state = %state id%)
suffices. To obtain the complete state configuration we connect the individual formulas, identifying the
single module states (in state id1, ..., in state idn ) of the QUMStateConfiguration, by the appropriate
Boolean operators. For the and-operator we get
ϕ = (in state id1&in state id2&...&in state idn)
as state formula representing the QUMStateConfiguration, for the or-operator we get
ϕ = (in state id1|in state id2|...|in state idn)
respectively. In analogy to the previous cases, the CSL formula
P=?[(true)U<=T (ϕ)]
can be used to determine the probability of reaching the QUMStateConfiguration within mission time T.
In addition to these three categories, we also generate the state formulas identifying the QUMState-
Configuration. These can be used to manually build more advanced CSL formulas in order to express
more complicated properties. We propose to use the ProProST specification patterns [11] in order to ob-
tain semantically correct CSL property specifications. It should be noted that according to the ProProST
specification pattern system the CSL formulas that we generate all fall into the category of probabilistic
existence. Also note that all formula patterns defined in [11] can be constructed with our tool using the
state formulas that we synthesize.
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4 Mapping of Probabilistic Counterexamples onto UML Sequence Dia-
grams
In order to hide the formal analysis model from the user, it is necessary to lift the results of the analysis
to the level of the UML model. In a first step, we map the counterexamples generated by DiPro to Fault
Trees [28]. This mapping is described in detail in [18] and is based on counterfactual-type causality
reasoning [13]. For the purpose of this paper it suffices to say that we establish the causal relationships
of the events of the model, that is transitions in the PRISM model, and the hazard (or other state formula)
under consideration. This allows us to omit events from the counterexamples that are not causal for the
hazard. The remaining events are then displayed in a fault tree. Even though the representation of the
counterexamples as fault tree already lifts the counterexamples onto the level of the UML model and
hence facilitates the analysis, it is still desirable to display the counterexamples in the same language as
the model that is analyzed, namely UML. We therefore also describe a translation of the counterexample
to UML Sequence Diagrams.
Since paths in a counterexample represent sequences of the system executions, UML sequence dia-
grams are an obvious choice to display probabilistic counterexamples. A sequence diagram in the UML
is a type of interaction diagram, similar to Message Sequence Charts [15], that shows how processes
interact with one another and in what order. An example of a UML sequence diagram can be found in
Figure 4.
In a sequence diagram different processes or objects that live simultaneously are represented as paral-
lel vertical lines, so called lifelines (cf. (1) in Figure 4). The messages exchanged between those objects
are represented by horizontal arrows with the message name written above them (cf. (2) in Figure 4).
Activation boxes, or method-call boxes, are opaque rectangles drawn on top of lifelines to represent that
processes are being performed in response to the reception of a message (cf. (3) in Figure 4). Objects
calling methods on themselves use messages and add new activation boxes on top of any other activation
boxes to indicate a further level of processing (cf. (4) in Figure 4). The order of events along individual
lifelines is total, from top to bottom. The order of potentially concurrent events across different lifelines
is partial, in keeping with the happened-before relation of [19]. In order to impose a total order of events,
message names can be labeled with natural numbers, as illustrated in Figure 10. Combined interaction
fragments can be used to change this event order and to display alternative (alt) sequences (cf. (5) in
Figure 4) or sequences that run concurrently (par) (cf. (6) in Figure 4).
Theoretically it is possible to map all paths of the counterexample directly to the sequence diagram.
Since this mapping would result in a sequence diagram with hundreds of alternative sequences, it is nec-
essary to extract those events from the counterexample that are causal for the hazard. This extraction is
done by our fault tree computation algorithm. The paths of the counterexample returned by this algo-
rithm are alternative execution paths of the system with the probability P. In order to express alternative
executions in sequence diagrams, an alt combined interaction fragment is used. The probability of the
path is given in the name of the corresponding alt combined interaction fragment. For each QUMCom-
ponent of the model we add a lifeline representing the component. We add a function transition(”source
state”,”target state”) to each component, in order to visualize the transitions that are taken inside the
component. A call to the transition function is added for each transition in the fault tree. If the transition
is a call of an operation of a QUMComponent, an operation call from the caller component to the callee
component is added to the sequence diagram. If the paths of the counterexample would be mapped di-
rectly to the sequence diagram, all paths, including possible interleavings of the paths, would be added to
the sequence diagram. When the fault tree computation is used to filter the paths, it is checked whether
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Figure 4: Example of a UML sequence diagram.
the order of the events does have effect on the causality. If the order of the events does not have an
effect on the causality, the events are represented by par combined fragments where each compartment
represents one event. The compartments of the par combined fragment can be either executed in parallel
or in any other possible concurrent interleaving. Otherwise, that is the order of the event is relevant, the
events are mapped to a sequence representing their order.
In order to display the sequence diagrams, the QuantUM tool appends the XMI code of the diagram
to the XMI file that contains the UML model. Thus, it can easily be imported in the UML CASE-tool
that was used to edit the original UML design model.
5 Case Study
We have applied our modeling and analysis approach to a case study from the automotive embedded
software domain. We performed an analysis of the design of an Electronic Control Unit for an Airbag
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system that is being developed at TRW Automotive GmbH, see also [4]. Note that the used probability
values are merely approximate ”ballpark” numbers, since the actual values are intellectual property of
our industrial partner TRW Automotive GmbH that we are not allowed to publish.
The airbag system architecture that we consider consists of two acceleration sensors whose task is
to detect front or rear crashes, one microcontroller to perform the crash evaluation, and an actuator that
controls the deployment of the airbag.
The deployment of the airbag is secured by two redundant protection mechanisms. The Field Effect
Transistor (FET) controls the power supply for the airbag squibs. If the Field Effect Transistor is not
armed, which means that the FET-Pin is not high, the airbag squib does not have enough electrical power
to ignite the airbag. The second protection mechanism is the Firing Application Specific Integrated
Circuit (FASIC) which controls the airbag squib. Only if it receives first an arm command and then a fire
command from the microcontroller it will ignite the airbag squib.
Although airbags save lives in crash situations, they may be fatal if they are inadvertently deployed.
This is because the driver may lose control of the car when this accidental deployment occurs. It is
hence a pivotal safety requirement that an airbag is never deployed if there is no crash situation. In order
to analyze how safe the considered system architecture, modeled with the CASE tool IBM Rational
Software Architect and shown in Figure 5, is, we annotated the model with our QuantUM extension and
performed an analysis with the QuantUM tool.
Figure 5: Class diagram modeling the airbag system.
The MicroController QUMComponent for instance, comprises one state machine representing its
normal behavior (cf. Fig. 6) and one state machine representing the failure pattern, which is shown in
Fig. 7. If the MicroController is in the normal state machine, it evaluates every 20ms whether there
is a crash or not. If the MainSensor and the SafetySensor were giving readings above the threshold
( acceleration > 3) for three consecutive evaluations, the MicroController concludes that there is a crash
and the state Crash is entered. In the Crash state, the FASIC is first armed, then the FET is enabled and
finally, the FASIC is fired. The failure pattern of the MicroController can be entered at any time, with
the rate specified for the QUMAbstractFailureTransition. As soon as it is entered it will execute the fire
sequence: enable FET, arm FASIC, and fire FASIC.
After all annotations were made, we exported the model into an XMI file, which was then imported
by the QuantUM tool and translated into a PRISM model. The import of the XMI file and translation
of the model was completed in less than two seconds. Without the QuantUM tool, this process would
require days of work of a trained engineer.
The resulting PRISM model consists of 3249 states and 15390 transitions. The QuantUM tool also
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Figure 6: State machine representing the normal behavior of the microcontroller.
generated the CSL formula P=?[(true)U<=T (inadvertent deployment)] where inadvertent deployment is
replaced by the state formula which identifies all states in the QUMStateConfiguration with the value
inadvertent deployment. T represents the mission time. Since the acceleration value of the sensor state
machines is always zero, the formula P=?[(true)U<=T (inadvertent deployment)] calculates the probabil-
ity of the airbag being deployed, during the mission time T , when there is no crash situation. Owing to
the use of the QuantUM tool, the only input which has to be given by the user is the mission time T .
We computed probabilities for the mission times T=10, T=100, and T=1000 and recorded the runtime
for the counterexample computation (Runtime CX), the number of paths in the counterexample (Paths
in CX), the runtime of the fault tree generation algorithm (Runtime FT) and the numbers of paths in the
fault tree (Paths in FT) in Figure 8. The experiments where performed on a PC with an Intel QuadCore
i5 processor with 2.67 Ghz and 8 GBs of RAM.
Figure 8 shows that the computation of the fault tree is finished in several seconds, whereas the
computation of the counterexample takes several minutes. While the different running times of the
counterexample computation algorithm seem to be caused by the different values of the mission time
T , the variation of the running time of the fault tree computation seems to be caused by background
processes on the PC on which the experiments were conducted.
Figure 9 shows the fault tree generated from the counterexample for T=10. While the counterexam-
ple consists of 738 paths, the fault tree comprises only 5 paths. It is easy to see by which basic events,
and with which probabilities, an inadvertent deployment of the airbag is caused. Obviously, there is
only one single fault that can lead to an inadvertent deployment, namely FASICShortage. It is also easy
to recognize that the basic event MicroControllerFailure, for instance, can only lead to an inadvertent
deployment if it is followed by one of the following sequences of basic events: enableFET, armFASIC,
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Figure 7: State machine representing the failure pattern of the microcontroller.
T Runtime CX (sec.) Paths in CX Runtime FT (sec.) Paths in FT
10 646.425 (approx. 10.77 min.) 738 2.86 5
100 664.893 (approx. 11.08 min.) 738 3.52 5
1000 820.431 (approx. 15.67 min.) 738 2.98 5
Figure 8: Experiment results for T=10, T=100 and T=1000.
and fireFASIC or enableFET, and FASICStuckHigh. If the basic event FETStuckHigh occurs prior to
the MicroControllerFailure, then the sequence armFASIC and fireFASIC occurring after the MicroCon-
trollerFailure event suffices.
The case study shows that the fault tree is a compact and concise visualization of the counterexample
which allows for an easy identification of the basic events that cause the inadvertent deployment of the
airbag, and their corresponding probabilities. If the order of the events is important, this can be seen in
the fault tree by the PAND-gate. Using a manual analysis one would have to manually compare the order
of the events in all 738 paths in the counterexample, which is a tedious and time consuming task.
Figure 10 shows a fragment of the UML sequence diagram which visualizes the counterexample for
T=10. The generation of the XMI code of the sequence diagram took less then one second. We imported
the XMI code into the UML model of the airbag system in the CASE tool IBM Rational Software
Architect. This allows us to interpret the counterexample directly in the CASE tool. An additional
benefit of the visualization of the counterexample as a sequence diagram is that operation calls can be
depicted. In Figure 10, for instance, it is easy to see how after a failure of the microcontroller the
operations enableFET(), armFASIC(), and fireFASIC() are called.
6 Related Work
The idea of using UML models to derive models for quantitative safety analysis is not new. In [22] the
authors present a UML profile for annotating software dependability properties. This annotated model is
then transformed into an intermediate model, that is then transformed into Timed Petri Nets. The main
drawbacks of this work is that it merely focuses on the structural aspect of the UML model, while the
actual behavioral description is not considered. Another drawback is the introduction of unnecessary
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Figure 9: Fault tree for the QUMStateConfiguration inadvertent deployment (T = 10).
redundant information in the UML model, since sometimes the joint use of more than one stereotype is
required. In [8] the authors extend the UML Profile for Modeling and Analysis of Real Time Embedded
Systems (MARTE) [24] with a profile for dependability analysis and modeling. While this work is very
expressive, it heavily relies on the use of the MARTE profile, which is only supported by very few UML
CASE tools. Additionally, the amount of stereotypes, tagged values and annotations that need to be
added to the model is very large. Another drawback of this approach is that the translation from the
annotated UML model into the Deterministic and Stochastic Petri Nets (DSPN) [2] used for analysis is
carried out manually which is, as we argue above, an error-prone and risky task for large UML models.
The work defined in [16] presents a stochastic extension of the Statechart notation, called StoCharts.
The StoChart approach suffers from the following drawbacks. First, it is restricted to the analysis of the
behavioral aspects of the system and does not allow for structural analysis. Second, while there exist
some tools that allow to draw StoCharts, there is no integration of StoCharts into UML models available.
In [9] the architecture dependability analysis framework Arcades is presented. While Arcade is very
expressive and was applied to hardware, software and infrastructure systems, the main drawback is that
it is based on a textual description of the system and hence would require a manual translation process
of the UML model to Arcade.
We are, to the best of our knowledge, not aware of any alternative approach that allows for the
automatic generation of the analysis model and the automatic CSL property construction.
7 Future Work
In future work we plan to extend the expressiveness of the QuantUM profile, to integrate methods to fur-
ther facilitate automatic stochastic property specification, and to apply our approach on other architecture
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Figure 10: Fragment of the UML sequence diagram for the QUMStateConfiguration inadver-
tent deployment (T = 10).
description languages such as, for instance, SysML [26].
At the moment the approach can be applied to all system and software architecture models that do
not make use of complex programming code in the entry-, during- or exit-action of the states. To further
extend our approach we plan to work on methods for the probabilistic analysis of object-oriented source
code attached to state machine transitions.
Additionally, we plan to conduct more case studies to prove the scalability of our approach.
8 Conclusion
We have presented an UML profile that allows for the annotation of UML models with quantitative in-
formation, together with a tool that automatically translates the model into the PRISM language and
performs the analysis with PRISM. In addition to the translation of the model, the tool also allows for
the automatic generation of CSL properties. Furthermore, we have developed a method, not described
in detail in this paper, that automatically generates a fault tree from a probabilistic counterexample. The
resulting fault trees were significantly smaller than the probabilistic counterexamples and hence easier to
understand, while still presenting all causally relevant information. We also presented a mapping of prob-
abilistic counterexamples to UML sequence diagrams which make the counterexamples interpretable in-
side the UML modeling tool. We believe that this is particularly useful for system and software architects
which usually can interpret an UML sequence diagram much better than fault trees, whereas safety en-
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gineers might prefer the visualization of the counterexamples as fault trees. We illustrated the usefulness
of our modeling and analysis approach using an industrial case study.
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